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Abstract
The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem states that every non-trivial
voting method between at least 3 alternatives can be strategically ma-
nipulated. We provea quantitative version of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
theorem: a random manipulation by a single random voter will suc-
ceed with non-negligible probability for every neutral voting method
between 3 alternatives that is far from being a dictatorship.
1 Introduction
A social choice function aggregates the preferences of all members of society
towards a common social choice. Formally, let [m] be a set of m alternatives
(candidates), over which n voters have preferences. The preferences of the
ith voter are speciﬁed as xi ∈ L, where L denotes the set of full orders over
[m] (thus L corresponds to Sm). Using this notation, a social choice function
is a function f : Ln → [m]. We will also write the vector x of preferences as
(xi,x−i) when wanting to single out the vote of the i’th voter, or as (x′
i,x−i)
after changing the ith coordinate to x′
i.
There is a vast literature on the design of social choice functions, also
called voting methods or election rules.
One of the basic desired properties from a social choice function is implied
by our thinking of them as “asking the voters about their preferences”:
voters should not gain from reporting false preferences rather than their
true ones. Formally:
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1Deﬁnition 1 A (proﬁtable) manipulation by voter i of a social choice func-
tion f at proﬁle (x1,...,xn) is a preference x′
i such that f(x′
i,x−i) is pre-
ferred by voter i to f(xi,x−i).
Intuitively, if such a manipulation exists, then voter i would be better
oﬀ by “voting strategically”: reporting x′
i as his preference rather than the
true xi. The Gibbard-Satherwaite theorem [Gib73, Sat75] states that every
“non-trivial” social choice function is strategically vulnerable, where “non-
trivial” means not a dictatorship and whose range contains at least three
alternatives. In this paper we ask how often does this happen: for what frac-
tion of proﬁles does such a manipulation exist?1 Can it be tiny? Perhaps
exponentially small? While some previous work studied speciﬁc classes of
social choice functions (e.g. [Ke93]), we provide a fairly general negative an-
swer for the case of 3 alternatives. Let us deﬁne the following quantiﬁcation
of the probability of a random manipulation:
Deﬁnition: The manipulation power of voter i on a social choice func-
tion f, denoted Mi(f), is the probability that x′
i is a proﬁtable manipulation
of f by voter i at proﬁle (x1,...,xn), where x1,...,xn and x′
i are chosen
uniformly at random among all full orders on [m].
This deﬁnition assumes a uniform distribution over preferences, which
while certainly unrealistic, is the natural choice for proving a “lower bound”2.
In particular, the lower bound, up to a factor δ, applies also to any distribu-
tion that gives each preference proﬁle at least a δ fraction of the probability
given by the uniform distribution.
To formally state our main theorem, we will require a few standard
deﬁnitions: A social choice function is neutral if the names of the candidates
“do not matter”, formally, if f commutes with permutations of [m], i.e.
f(σ(x1),...,σ(xn)) = σ(f(x1,...,xn)). A dictatorship is a social choice
function that always chooses the top choice of a ﬁxed voter. The distance
of f from a dictatorship is simply the minimal fraction of values that need
to be changed to turn f into a dictatorship.
Main Theorem: There exists a constant C > 0 such that For every ǫ > 0,
if f is a neutral social choice function among 3 alternatives for n voters that
is ǫ-far from dictatorship, then:
Pn
i=1 Mi(f) ≥ Cǫ2.
1Functions that are very close to being a dictatorship may have a very small number
of such manipulable proﬁles (e.g. [MPS04]), so this paper is concerned with social choice
functions that are far from being trivial.
2Note that we cannot hope for an impossibility result for every distribution, e.g. since
for every social choice function we can take a distribution on its non-manipulable proﬁles.
2This immediately implies that for ﬁxed ǫ, some voter has non-negligible
manipulation power maxi Mi(f) ≥ Ω(1/n). It is easy to see that one cannot
bound maxi Mi(f) below by a constant independently of n since for the
plurality voting method Mi(f) = θ(1/
√
n) Furthermore, for the plurality
voting method only for a 1/
√
n fraction of proﬁles can manipulated at all
by any single player. While it is easy to see that the bound on
P
i Mi(f)
cannot be improved to being more than a constant, the ﬁrst open problem
we leave is whether the bound on maxi Mi(f) can be improved further. We
also do not know how to replace the neutrality condition with the weaker
“correct” condition: being far from having a range of size at most 2. We
leave this as the second open problem.
Our third open problem concerns the case of more than three alterna-
tives, m > 3. While some parts of our proof extend to this case, (and indeed
we took the care to state them in the general form), we were not able to ex-
tend all required parts of the proof. We do conjecture that the theorem does
generalize to m > 3, perhaps with the exact form of the bound decreasing
polynomially in m. This is our third open problem.
This would have implications regarding a recent line of research attempt-
ing to ﬁnd social choice functions that are computationally hard to manip-
ulate on the average. It is known that for several social choice functions,
manipulation, as an algorithmic problem, is NP-complete [BTT89, BO91].
Several authors asked whether this computational hardness can also be ex-
tended to the average case – a computational version of our question – and
some “computational hardness augmentation” techniques have been given
[CS03, EL05]. Some results for restricted classes of social choice functions
have been obtained previously [PR06],[CS06], but no general results. Our
conjecture implies that even a random attempted manipulation has non-
negligible probability of being proﬁtable, and thus that the computational
hardness of manipulation in the average case is trivial.
A word is in order regarding our techniques. Our starting point is
the recent work of [Ka02] that obtained quantitative versions of Arrow’s
theorem [Arr51] using methods that involve the Fourier transform on the
boolean hypercube. Our proof then has two further components. First,
a “quantitative-preserving” reduction from Arrow’s theorem to a variant
of the Gibbard-Satherwaite theorem that allows multi-voter manipulation,
and then a directed isoperimetric inequality that allows us to move to single-
voter manipulation. Our proof of the isoperimetric inequality relies on the
FKG correlation inequality [FKG71] (or, more precisely, on Harris’ inequal-
ity, [Ha60]).
32 Preliminaries and Notation
2.1 Preferences
Let [m] denote a ﬁnite set of m alternatives, m ≥ 3. Denote by L the set of
total orders on [m]. We view L as a subset of the space {0,1}(
m
2), in which
each bit denotes the “preference” between two alternatives, where in L these
must be transitive, but in {0,1}(
m
2) not necessarily so. We will denote the
input from society by a matrix x where we also view x as a column vector
(x1,...,xn) ∈ Ln, where each coordinate xi is a row vector of the form
xi ∈ {0,1}(
m
2), where for a,b ∈ [m], x
a,b
i = 1 denotes that voter i prefers





Given any two functions f,g from a probability space X to a set Y we
denote the distance between f and g as
∆(f,g) = Pr
x∈X
[f(x)  = g(x)].
If G is a family of such functions we deﬁne ∆(f,G) = ming∈G ∆(f,g). In
our setting X will always be endowed with the uniform probability, so the
distance between two functions is nothing else than the proportion of inputs
on which the functions disagree.
2.2 Social Choice Functions
A social choice function (henceforth SCF) is a function f : Ln → [m]. SCFs
are also called voting methods.
A SCF is called neutral if it does not depend on the “names” of elements
of [m]. Formally, if it commutes with the action of all permutations on [m].
2.3 Social Welfare Functions
A generalized SWF (GSWF) is a function F : Ln → {0,1}(
m
2). For every
a,b ∈ A we denote by Fa,b the (a,b)’th bit output by F. For convenience
we sometimes abuse notation and write the output of Fa,b as a or b rather
than 1 or 0. A social welfare function (SWF) is a function F : Ln → L, i.e.
where F(x) is a full (linear) order for all x.
F is said to have a Condorcet winner on x if for some a we have that
for all b, Fa,b(x) = 1. We denote by CW the set of all GSWFs that have a
Condorcet winner for all x. Note that SWF ⊆ CW.
4A GSWF is called neutral if it does not depend on the “names” of ele-
ments of [m]. Formally, if it commutes with all permutations on [m].
A GSWF is said to satisfy independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)
if the social ranking of any two alternatives depends only on the rankings of
all participants between these two alternatives. Formally, if Fa,b is in fact
a function just of xa,b rather than of all coordinates of x, as allowed by the
general deﬁnition.
Note that if F is a GSWF which is both neutral and IIA then it is
determined by a single Boolean function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}, in the sense
that Fa,b(xa,b) = f(xa,b) for all a,b ∈ [m]. The neutrality also implies that
in this case f is an odd function: f(¯ x) = 1 − f(x), where ¯ xi = 1 − xi. In




As usual in Arrow-type theorems we will be concerned with functions f(x),
where x is a vector and f depends only on a single coordinate xi.
The i-dictatorship SCF is given by dicti(x) being the top element in xi.
The i-anti-dictatorship SCF is given by dicti(x) being the bottom element
in xi. We denote the set of dictatorships and anti-dictatorships by DICT.
The i-dictatorship SWF is given by Dicti(x) = xi, here, of course, xi
is an order. The i-anti-dictatorship is given by Dicti(x) = xi, where xi is
the reverse of xi. We denote the set of dictatorships and anti-dictatorships
by DICT, as we did with SCFs. (It will always be clear from the context
whether we mean a SCF or a SWF).
Finally we will also use DICT to denote the set of Boolean functions
f : {0,1}n → {0,1} that depend on a single coordinate, i.e f(x) = xi or
f(x) = 1 − xi.
3 Overview of the proof
We recall our deﬁnition of manipulation power and our main theorem.
Deﬁnition 2 The manipulation power of voter i on a social choice function
f denoted Mi(f), is the probability that x′
i is a proﬁtable manipulation of f
by voter i at proﬁle x1...xn, where x1...xn and x′
i are chosen uniformly at
random in Ln.
Theorem 1 There exists a constant C > 0 such that for every ǫ > 0 the
following holds. If f is a SCF for n voters over 3 alternatives and ∆(f,g) > ǫ
for any dictatorship g, then f has total manipulability:
Pn
i=1 Mi(f) ≥ Cǫ2.
5This theorem is proved in three steps. The ﬁrst two apply also for m > 3
are are stated for general m.
3.1 Step 1
The ﬁrst step is based on the work of [Ka02] and concerns Social Welfare
Functions:
Lemma 1 For every ﬁxed m and ǫ > 0 there exists δ > 0 such that if F =
f⊗(
m
2) is a neutral IIA GSWF over m alternatives with f : {0,1}n → {0,1},
and ∆(f,DICT) > ǫ, then F has probability of at least δ of not having a
Condorcet Winner. For m = 3,4,5, δ = Cǫ, where C > 0 is an absolute
constant.
The case m = 3, which is all that is needed for our main theorem, was
proved by [Ka02]. Our proof for general values of m gives δ that decrease as
ǫO(m). However, we conjecture that for ﬁxed ǫ > 0 not only that δ need not
decrease with m, it actually tends to 1. This is supported by recent work of
Mossel [Mo07] who calculated the asymptotic value limm limn[1 − δ(m)] =
exp(−Θ(m5/3)) for the case when Fa,b : {0,1}n → {0,1} is the majority
function on xa,b for all a,b ∈ [m].
Also, since our starting point is assuming that F is not close to a dicta-
torship, it is worthwhile noting that in principle, when ǫ is suﬃciently small,
∆(f,DICT) = θ(m∆(F,DICT)).
3.2 Step 2
The second step is a reduction from social welfare functions to social choice
functions, with a diﬀerent notion of manipulation: by many voters.
Deﬁnition 3 Let f be a SCF and let a,b ∈ A. Denote
Ma,b(f) = Pr[f(x) = a, f(x′) = b],
where x,x′ are chosen at random in Ln with xa,b = (x′)a,b.
I.e. this deﬁnition captures the scenario where all players together at-
tempt to manipulate f to be b rather than a by re-choosing at random
all their preferences – except those between a and b. This deﬁnition does
not require that anyone in particular gain from this, just that something
“unexpected” happens.
6Our reduction works as follows. Given a SCF f with low Ma,b(f) for all
a,b, we construct an IIA GSWF F that is close to always having a Condorcet
winner, hence, by Lemma 1, close to DICT. Our construction will be such
that this will imply that f too is close to DICT, hence:
Lemma 2 For every ﬁxed m there exists δ > 0 such that for all ǫ > 0 the
following holds. Let f be a neutral SCF between m alternatives such that
∆(f,DICT) > ǫ. Then for all (a,b) we have Ma,b(f) ≥ δ. For m = 3,
δ = Cǫ2, where C > 0 is an absolute constant.
3.3 Step 3
The third step shows that, for m = 3, the probability of this type of multi-
voter manipulation yields a lower bound on the probability of single-voter
manipulation:




The combination of this lemma with lemma 2 immediately implies the
main theorem. (Note that while Lemma 2 requires that the SCF also be far
from anti-dictatorships, which our theorem does not, all functions close to
anti-dictatorships are trivially highly manipulable.) We do not know how
to generalize this lemma to m > 3.
4 Proof of Step 1
The case m = 3 is shown in [Ka02]:
Theorem 2 ([Ka02], Theorem 7.2) For every balanced IIA GSWF F and
every ǫ > 0 we have that ∆(F,DICT) ≥ ǫ implies ∆(F,SWF) ≥ Cǫ, where
C > 0 is an absolute constant.
Balanced here means that for all a,b ∈ A , Pr[Fa,b(xa,b) = a] = 1/2,
where xa,b is chosen uniformly in {0,1}n. This condition is certainly true
for neutral functions since for those Pr[Fa,b(xa,b) = a] = Pr[Fa,b(xa,b) = b].
This theorem implies lemma 1 for the case m = 3 since in this case having
a Condorcet winner in F(x) is equivalent to being a full order, F(x) ∈ L,
i.e. for m = 3, SWF = CW.
For m > 3, having a Condorecet winner is a weaker requirement than
being a full order, and thus Kalai’s theorem does not directly imply lemma 1.
7The cases of m = 4,5 are proved in appendix 1. At this point we can prove
the lemma for all values of m using full induction. Once we have lemma 1
for values m1 and m2 then we can also deduce it for m = m1 + m: Let
F = f⊗(
m
2), and f be ǫ-far from dictatorship. Using the lemma on m1,m2
we get that with probability at least δm1 there is no Condorect winner
among the ﬁrst m1 alternatives and with probability at least δm2 there is
no Condorcet winner among the last m2 alternatives. The key point here
is that these two events are independent since the voter preferences within
two disjoint sets of alternatives are totally independent of each other. Thus
the probability that there is no Condorect winner at all is at least δm1  δm2.
Staring with δ = Cǫ for m = 3,4,5 we get δ ≥ (Cǫ)⌊m/3⌋ for general m.
(Luckily, every integer m > 5 is of the form m = 3x + 4y, with x and y
nonnegative integers.)
5 Proof of Step 2
We will use any function f with low Ma,b for all a,b ∈ [m] to construct a
IIA GSWF F that is close to always having a Condorcet winner.
Deﬁnition 4 For every a,b ∈ [m] let us deﬁne Fa,b(xa,b) to be a if
Pr
x′ [f(x′) = a | x′a,b = xa,b] > Pr
x′ [f(x′) = b | x′a,b = xa,b]
and to be b if the reverse inequality holds. (Here, for sake of clarity we write
the output of Fa,b as a or b rather than 0 or 1.) In the case of equality we
break the tie deﬁning Fa,b(xa,b) to be the majority vote over the n values
x
a,b
i . (And if n is even we add a further tie breaking rule, e.g. in case of a
tie take the majority of all voters but the ﬁrst.)
This deﬁnes an IIA GSWF F.
It will be convenient to analyze F using a measure that is closely related
to Ma,b:
Deﬁnition 5 We will say that x is a minority preference on (a,b) if f(x) =
a and Fa,b(x) = b or if f(x) = b and Fa,b(x) = a.
We say that x is a minority preference if it is a minority preference for at
least some pair (a,b). Denote by Na,b(f) = Prx[xis a minority preference on (a,b)].
It is easy to relate Na,b to Ma,b, using the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality:
Lemma 4 For every SCF f and every a,b we have that Ma,b(f) ≥ (Na,b(f))2.
8Proof: Fix f and a,b. Deﬁne pa(xa,b) = Pr[f(x) = a] and pb(xa,b) =
Pr[f(x) = b] where the probabilities are taken over a random x ∈ L whose




So we can bound
Ma,b(f) = E[pa   pb] ≥ E[(min{pa,pb})2] ≥ (E[min{pa,pb}])2 = (Na,b(f))2,
where the second inequality is Cauchy-Schwarz.
We are now ready to prove the properties of the constructed F.
Lemma 5 1. ∆(F,CW) ≤
P
a,b∈[m] Na,b(f).
2. ∆(F,DICT) ≥ ∆(f,DICT) −
P
a,b∈[m] Na,b(f).
3. If f is neutral then so is F.
Proof: Fix x that is not a minority preference and denote a = f(x). Note
that by deﬁnition for all b we must have that Fa,b(x) = 1 and thus a is a
Condorcet winner in F(x).
Item 1 follows since we get immediately that the distance from CW is
bounded from above by the probability that x is a minority preference.
For item 2, for those x with F(x) = Dicti(x) we get that x
a,b
i = 1
and thus a is the top choice of xi and thus f(x) = dicti(x). (Similarly for
anti-dictatorship.)
Item 3 is trivial by deﬁnition.
From this lemma it follows that a SCF f that is far from dictatorship
and has low multi-voter manipulation Ma,b(f) yields an IIA SWF that is
far from dictatorship and close to always having a Condorecet winner.
We should note that a certain converse is true as well. If we have an IIA
GSWF F with ∆(F,CW) ≤ ǫ then we can deﬁne f(x) to be the Condorcet
winner of F(x) (and some other candidate if a Condorecet winner does not
exist – this rule can be made to retain neutrality). Note that due to F
beeing IIA, f(x) = a and f(x′) = b with xa,b = x′a,b can happen only if
either F(x) or F(x′) does not have a Condorcet winner, thus Ma,b(f) ≤ 2ǫ.
96 Proof of Step 3
In this section we study the combinatorial structures underlying Ma,b(f)
and
P
i Mi(f) and relating them.
For the rest of this section let us ﬁx the set of alternatives [m] = {a,b,c}
and ﬁx a SCF f.
Deﬁnition 6 For every value of za,b denote A(za,b) = {x|xa,b = za,b, f(x) =
a} and B(za,b) = {x|xa,b = za,b, f(x) = b}.
Note that for every possible value of za,b there are exactly 3n possible
values of x that agree with it: in x the preferences of all voters between
a and b are given and each voter may choose one of three locations for c:
above both a and b, below both of them, or between them. Thus, for every
ﬁxed za,b it will be usefull to view the set {x|xa,b = za,b}n as isomorphic
to {0,1,2}n = {above,between,below}n and to view A(za,b) and B(za,b) as
residing in this space. We will use v = (v1...vn) to denote a point in this
space. Thus once x
a,b







i = 0 and vi = 0 encodes the preference c ≻i b ≻i a.
In these terms we can directly express Ma,b(f):








Proof: This is just a re-wording of the deﬁnition of Ma,b(f).
In order to relate Mi(f) to these sets we need to add directed edges to
{0,1,2}n that capture (some of) the proﬁtable manipulations by player i.
For each ﬁxed value of xa,b, for each player i and each v−i we will have 3
directed edges going in direction i between the possible values of vi: 0 → 1,
1 → 2, and 0 → 2. We will count the directed edges going “upward” from
A and from B.
Deﬁnition 7 For a subset A ⊆ {0,1,2}n, its upper edge border, ∂A is the
set of directed edges deﬁned above whose tail is in A and whose head is not
in A. Formally,
∂iA = {(v−i,vi,v′
i) | (v−i,vi) ∈ A, (v−i,v′





We now relate Mi(f) to the upper edge border in direction i.






Proof: Let us choose x and x′ at random, diﬀering only (possibly) in that
xi may be diﬀerent from x′
i and provide a lower bound on the probability
that the ith coordinate of one is a proﬁtable manipulation of the other. We
perform this random choice as follows: ﬁrst x
a,b
−i ∈ {0,1}n, x
a,b
i ∈ {0,1} and
x
′a,b





i and the rest of the analysis will be conditioned on
this indeed happening (a conditioning that does not aﬀect the distribution
chosen). We next choose v−i ∈ {0,1,2}n−1 and ﬁnally vi ∈ {0,1,2} and
v′
i ∈ {0,1,2} are chosen at random. Note that if (v−i,vi,v′
i) ∈ ∂iA then
either x′
i is a manipulation of x or xi is a manipulation of x′. This is
because when moving from xi to x′
i voter i lowered his relative preference
of c without changing his ranking of the pair (a,b), with f(x) changing
from a to some other result t ∈ {b,c}. If, according to xi, voter i prefers
t to a then x′
i is a manipulation. If, in the other case, xi ranks a above
t then this is deﬁnitely true for x′
i too, since when moving from xi to x′
i
a’s rank relative to b did not change, whereas it improved relative to c.
Hence, in the second case xi is a manipulation of x′. Thus every edge in ∂iA
corresponds to a pair x,x′ that is chosen with probability 1
2   3−n   1
3, which
contributes in total 1
63−nEx[|∂iA(xa,b)|. A similar contribution comes from
the case (v−i,vi,v′
i) ∈ ∂iB.





















and the following lemma, when applied to A(xa,b) and B(xa,b) will ﬁnally
yield Lemma 3, completing the proof of step three.
Lemma 8 For every disjoint A,B ⊂ {0,1,2}n we have that |∂(A)|+|∂(B)| ≥
3−n|A||B|.
11Proof: Let us start by “shifting” both A and B upward. I.e. for each
i = 1,...,n, at stage i we replace A by a set of the same size that is
monotone in the i’th coordinate by moving every v with vi < 2 to have
vi = 2 if this is not already in A, and then moving every v that remained
with vi = 0 to have vi = 1 if this is not already in A. Thus the i’th stage
leaves A to be “monotone in the i’th coordinate”, i.e. if v ∈ A and v′
i ≥ vi
then (v−iv′
i) ∈ A. Clearly such a stage does not change the size of A. As
usual in such operations, it is not hard to check that this operation does not
increase ∂jA for any j, and does not destroy the monotonicity in previous
indices.
Let A′ and B′ be the sets we obtained after all n stages. Since every
edge in ∂A corresponds at most to one vertex shifted from A to A′, and the
same holds for B we have
|A′ \ A| ≤ |∂(A)|, |B′ \ B| ≤ |∂(B)|.
Since both A′ and B′ are monotone in the partial order of the lattice
{0,1,2}n they are ”positively correlated”, by Harris’ theorem [Ha60], or by
the better known generalization, the FKG inequality [FKG71]. This means
that
|A′ ∩ B′|/3n ≥ |A′|/3n   |B′|/3n = |A|/3n   |B|/3n.
However A and B were disjoint so A′ ∩ B′ ⊆ (A′ \ A) ∪ (B′ \ B), which
completes the proof.
References
[Arr51] K. Arrow. Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University
Press, 1951.
[BO91] J. Bartholdi, III and J. Orlin. Single transferable vote resists
strategic voting. Social Choice and Welfare, 8(4):341354, 1991.
[BTT89] J. Bartholdi, III, Tovey C, and M. Trick. Computational diﬃ-
culty of manipulating an election. Social Choice and Welfare,
6(3):227–241, 1989.
[CS03] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Universal voting protocol tweaks
to make manipulation hard. In IJCAI, 781788, 2003.
[CS06] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Nonexistence of voting rules that
are usually hard to manipulate. In AAAI, 2006.
12[EL05] E. Elkind and H. Lipmaa. Hybrid voting protocols and hardness
of manipulation. In ISAAC , 2005.
[FKG71] Fortuin, Kasteleyn and Ginibre, Correlation inequalities on
some partially ordered sets. Comm. of Math. Phy., 1971.
[Gib73] Allan Gibbard. Manipulation of voting schemes: a general re-
sult. Econometrica, 41:587–601, 1973.
[Ha60] T. E. Harris A lower bound for the critical probability in a
certain percolation process. Proc. Cambridge Philos. Soc. 56
1960 13–20.
[Ka02] G. Kalai. A Fourier-Theoretic Perspective for the Condorcet
Paradox and Arrow’s theorem. Adv. in Appl. Math. 29, 412-
426, 2002.
[Ke93] J.S. Kelly. Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable,
but a few aren’t. Social choice and Welfare, 10, 1993.
[MPS04] Maus, Stefan and Peters, Hans and Storcken,Ton. Minimal Ma-
nipulability: Anonymity and Unanimity. Research Memoranda
026, Maastricht, 2004.
[Mo07] E. Mossel, Noise Stability of Functions with Low Inﬂuences: In-
variance and Optimality II - The Non Reversible Case. Preprint.
[PR06] A. D. Procaccia and J.S. Rosenschein. Junta distributions and
the average-case complexity of manipulating elections. In AA-
MAS, 2006.
[Sat75] Mark Allen Satterthwaite. Strategy-proofness and arrow’s con-
dition: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting pro-
cedures and social welfare functions. Journal of Economic The-
ory, pages 187–217, 1975.
Appendix: Social Welfare Functions with m = 4,5
In this appendix we will deduce the generalization of Kalai’s theorem for
m = 4,5 from the case m = 3. Unfortunately, so far we have had no success
in pushing these methods further.
Our starting point is the following version of Theorem 2 (which follows
easily from the original version).
13Theorem 3 There exists a constant δ3 > 0 such that the following holds.
Let F be a neutral IIA GSWF, with n voters and 3 alternatives, determined
by a function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}. Let C3(F) be the probability over X that
F(X) has a Condorcet winner. Then
C3(F) ≤ 1 − δ3   ∆(f,DICT).
What we prove is the same for m = 4,5:
Theorem 4 For m = 4,5, there exists a constant δm > 0 such that the
following holds. Let F be a neutral IIA GSWF, with n voters and m alter-
natives, determined by a function f : {0,1}n → {0,1}. Let Cm(F) be the
probability over X that F(X) has a Condorcet winner. Then
Cm(F) ≤ 1 − δm   ∆(f,DICT).
We begin by considering the case m = 4. Let there be four candidates
{1,2,3,4}. Let Xij be the random 0/1 variable that indicates the event that
i beats j according to F(X) where X is chosen at random. Note that, from
neutrality, the probability of F(X) having a Condorcet winner is precisely
four times the probability that candidate 1 is a Condorcet winner. Hence
C4(F) = 4   E[
4 Y
j=2
X1j] = 4   E[
4 Y
j=2
(1 − Xj1)]. (1)
Before expanding this, note the following. From neutrality of F it follows
that f is balanced, hence for i ∈ {2,3,4}
E[Xi1] = 1/2.









Finally, from neutrality, the probability of candidate 1 being a Condorcet









14Now, using these observations we expand (1) to get











C4(F) = 2C3(F) − 1, (2)
which implies
C4(F) ≤ 1 − 2δ3∆(f,DICT),
and yields the theorem for m = 4 with δ4 = 2δ3.
Next we consider the case of m = 5. Unfortunately, the ﬁrst natural
step, generalizing the inclusion-exclusion type formula (1) to get









j=2(1 − Xj1)] which appear on the two sides of the equation have
the same sign, and cancel out. To remedy this we consider the case of m = 6.
We begin with










































− 1 = C5(F).





i.e. the theorem for m = 5 with δ5 = 5
3δ3.
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